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COMMENTS I
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN AN ACTION OF MALPRACTICE
When a plaintiff-patient is injured by the malpractice of a doctor or dentist,
but does not learn that he is injured until a later time, a real question is presented
as to when the statute of limitations starts to run. Does the statute commence
to run from the time of the wrongful act or omission or is the running of the
statute tolled until the plaintiff knows or should know of his right of action? '
A few cases have held that the statute is tolled until the plaintiff knows or should
know of his right of action 2 but California is the only jurisdiction which con-
sistently states this to be the law.'
The prevailing view is that the statute runs from the time of the defendant's
negligent act or omission irrespective of the plaintiff's knowledge of the injury."
However, even in those jurisdictions adopting this view, an exception is made
when a person guilty of malpractice fraudulently conceals that fact and prevents
the plaintiff from gaining knowledge of his right of action. In such situations,
it has been decided that the statute does not begin to run until the cause of action
is, or should have been, discovered.' There is also authority to the effect that
the statute does not start to run until the treatment ends, when a doctor or
dentist leaves a foreign substance in a patient's body and continues to treat the
patient without discovering the substance.' In such a case, the character of
the defendant's negligence is considered to continue until termination of the
treatment.
Pennsylvania does not clearly adopt either of the above positions. The
pertinent portion of the applicable statute reads:
Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully
done to the person, in case where the injury does not result in death, must be
I Compare Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940) and Cappuci v. Barone, 266
Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919); with Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942).
2 E.g., Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954); Fraser v. Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66
Ga. App. 630, 19 S.E. 2d 38 (1942); Kitchner v. Williams, 171 Kan. 540, 236 P. 2d 64 (1951).
8 E.g., Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936); Pellett v. Sonotone Corp.,
55 Cal. App. 2d 196, 130 P.2d 181 (1942); Ehlen v. Burrows, supra note 1.
4 E.g., Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940); Grambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn.
380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Maloney v. Brackett, 275 Mass. 479, 176 N.E. 604 (1931); Weinstein
v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L. 632, 162 Atd. 601 (1932); Conklin v. Draper, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529, aff'd.
254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930).
5 E.g., Colvin v. Warren, 44 Ga. App. 825, 163 S.E. 268 (1932); Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn.
70, 45 S.W. 2d 238 (1932); Thompson v. Barnard, 142 S.W. 2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
6 E.g., Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. App. 1934); Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or.
559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942).
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brought within two years from the time when the injury was done and not
afterwards.7 (Emphasis added.)
A situation could arise where the negligent act or omission would occur at
one time, while the injury would not occur until later. In such situations, the
statute runs from the time of the injury and not from the time of the negligent
act or omission.8 Consequently, in deciding when the statute starts to run in
an action of malpractice, as in any other case of wrongful injury to the person,
the time when the injury was done must be determined. This can become a
troublesome, if not an impossible task. For example, when a foreign substance
is negligently left in a patient's body, it is difficult to ascertain exactly when the
injury was done and when the statute should start running.
In the recent case of Ayers v. Morgan,' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
considered this problem, and decided that the plaintiff's claim against the de-
fendant-surgeon was not barred by the statute of limitations even though the
action had not been brought within two years from the time the defendant had
negligently left a surgical sponge in the plaintiff's abdomen. The defendant
had operated on the plaintiff for an ulcer on April 20, 1948. For nine years
after his discharge from the hospital, the plaintiff continued to be bothered by
abdominal pains. On January 3, 1957, the surgical sponge was discovered, and
it was determined that it had been the cause of the plaintiff's discomfort. In
reversing a decision for the defendant and granting the plaintiff a new trial,
Justice Musmanno, speaking for the majority, stated:
The plaintiff in the case at bar could hardly have launched his lawsuit
on the day Dr. Morgan performed the operation because, at that time, no injury
was yet inflicted. The injury became a reality when the sponge began to break
down healthful tissue within the body of the plaintiff.1o
When did the sponge begin "to break down healthful tissue" and thereby
inflict injury upon the plaintiff ? Justice Musmanno did not say, and it is vir-
tually impossible to estimate when the injury occurred. Therefore, some other
means must be used to ascertain the time of injury. Justice Musmanno later
stated: "The injury is done when the act heralding a possible tort inflicts a
damage which is physically objective and ascertainable." " Since the damage
did not become "physically objective and ascertainable" until 1957 when the
sponge was discovered, the decision is in reality a declaration that the injury
7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1895).
8 DiGironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F.Supp. 795 (E. D. Pa. 1951); Foley v. Pittsburgh
Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d. 517 (1949).
9397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
'0 1d. at 287, 154 A.2d at 790.
"I Id. at 290, 154 A.2d at 792.
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is not done until the plaintiff knows, or should know, of it. Consequently, the
court is saying, in effect, that the statute of limitations does not start to run until
the plaintiff knows, or should know, that he is injured.
The court further indicates approval of the view that the statute is tolled
until the plaintiff is, or should be, aware of his injury by citing Byers v. Bacon.12
In that case, the defendant failed to remove a tube from the plaintiff's body after
an operation. The tube was not discovered until 1913, three years after the
operation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a lower court decision
for the defendant, granted the plaintiff a new trial, and stated:
[I]t should have been a question for careful consideration, as to whether
the statute should properly have been regarded as running against plaintiff,
until such time as he could reasonably be charged with knowledge of the fact
that the tube had been overlooked and left in the wound.13
This suggests that the statute should not start to run until the plaintiff has, or
should have, knowledge of his injury.
A case which the court in its latest decision did not mention, however, was
Bernath v. LeFever.14 In that case, the defendant operated on the plaintiff's eye
on January 9, 1930, and again on May 9, 1931. An inflammation developed
which made necessary the removal of the eye. Plaintiff instituted suit on August
8, 1932. The defendant contended that the injury was done at the time of the
first operation, and that the statute of limitations started running from that time,
even though the plaintiff did not become aware of the injury until she learned
that a second operation had to be performed. The court agreed, and stated
in affirming a judgment for the defendant:
It is too well established to require extensive discussion that the statute
runs from the time when the injury was done even though the damage may
not have been known, or may not in fact have occurred until afterwards.15
The court further stated: "It is true that the running of the statute is postponed
where, by some independent act of fraud or concealment, a wrongdoer prevents
or diverts discovery." 1 As to this point Pennsylvania is directly in line with
the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. However, it is evident that
there is a conflict in Pennsylvania case law as to when the statute begins to run
when malpractice is involved.
12 250 Pa. 564, 95 At. 711 (1915).
I1 Id. at 567, 95 At!. at 711.
14325 Pa. 43, 189 At. 342 (1937).
15 Id. at 46, 189 Atl. 'at 343.
1s Id. at 47, 189 At!. at 344.
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The effect of this conflict on the lower courts is well illustrated by Simmons
v. Saltz.' The plaintiff in that case brought suit against a dentist for negligently
extracting certain teeth. The suit was instituted more than two years after the
extractions were made, but not more than two years after the plaintiff knew of
the condition caused by the defendant's negligence. The court recognized
both the Byers and Bernath cases, but followed the latter in denying the plaintiff
a judgment on the grounds that the later decision was the law in Pennsylvania.1"
Before deciding what effect the latest Pennsylvania decision has on this
uncertainty in our law, the purpose of the statute of limitations and the inter-
pretation which the courts have given it must be examined to determine which
view is the more desirable. Concerning the general purpose behind statutes of
limitations, Justice Maxey of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once stated:
It has always been the policy of the law to expediate litigation and not
to encourage long delays. From this fact arose the various statutes of limita-
tions, and the reasons why the law is unfavorable to delayed litigation are self-
evident. If any person has a right which he wishes enforced, he should enforce
it promptly. The person against whom the right is to be enforced might be
greatly prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay. Witnesses disappear or remove to
distant parts and the entire aspect of the parties on both sides may change with
the lapse of time.19
Statutes of limitations have also been described as statutes of repose. 0  It
has been stated that they:
find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They
represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic
devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from
being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or dis-
appeared, and evidence has been lost.21
In the case of an action for malpractice, the defendant probably has not
preserved his records of the operation for longer than the prescribed period of
limitation. To allow a claim after five or ten years have passed may work an
undue hardship on the defendant.
Although a statute of limitations must be raised by the defendant as an
affirmative defense, and although the purpose is not so much to punish the
- 9 Pa. D. & C. 2d 605 (1957).
is id. at 607. The court stated, "We think, however, that the law of the Commonwealth, by
reason of the more recent decision in Bernath v. LeFever, supra, is established to be that the
statute runs from the time of the alleged negligence unless fraud and active concealment is
pleaded and proved."
19Ulakovic v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 571, 575, 16 A.2d 41, 42 (1940).
20 Philadelphia, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 282 Pa. 362, 127 Alt. 845
(1925).
21 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944).
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plaintiff as to aid the defendant, such a statute does have a punitive effect.
Through the passage of time, the courts have come to look upon statutes of
limitation with favor and have been quick to hold a plaintiff's claim barred
when the statute is raised as a defense.2" If an injured party "slumbers on his
rights" and does not promptly litigate his case, he finds that his recovery is
barred by the statute of limitations. In this way, the statute serves to stimulate
the prompt and efficient disposition of litigation.
In a case like Ayers v. Morgan, however, where the plaintiff does not and
cannot, through ordinary diligence, know of his right of action, it is doubtful
whether the statute should be so strictly construed and applied. The situation
of a person resting on his rights and not dutifully asserting his claim is not
present. Rather, such an individual does not realize that he has any rights.
After the statutory period elapses, the injured party may become aware of his
right of action only to find it has been cut off. In Urie v. Thompson,2" the court
reasoned that to have a statute of limitations run before a plaintiff had reason
to know of his injury could not have been intended by any legislature and could
not be, "reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations." 24
Courts which have refused to allow the statute of limitations to be tolled
in malpractice cases, merely because of the lack of knowledge on the part of the
injured party, have apparently felt that the particular statute involved could not
be interpreted to permit such a claim. Justice Musmanno, however, said of the
Pennsylvania statute:
This statute, as all statutes, of course, must be read in the light of reason
and common sense. . . . [I]t must not be made to produce something which
the Legislature, as a reasonably-minded body, could never have intended.2 5
The General Assembly, in enacting the statute, probably did not foresee the
possibility of an injured party's remedy being taken away before he realized
that he was injured. That body could not have intended such an unreasonable
result. Of course, the problem of witnesses being dead and evidence being un-
available is still present. Those possibilities notwithstanding, it is a question
of whether a wrongdoer or an innocent injured party, who has done everything
possible to assert his claim, should be given the protection of the law. The just
rule is that the statute of limitations does not start to run until the injured party
knows, or should know, of his injury.
22Schulte v. Westborough Inc., 163 Kan. 111, 180 P.2d 278 (1947); cf. Tynan v. Walker,
35 Cal. 634, 95 Am. Dec. 152 (1868); Regan v. Williams, 185 Mo. 620, 84 S.W. 959 (1905).
23 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
24d. at 170.
25 397 Pa. at 284, 154 A.2d at 789.
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It should be noted that a number of states have statutes of limitations which
apply specifically to actions for malpractice.2" The Pennsylvania statute, how-
ever, applies to actions for personal injuries generally, including those brought
for malpractice. The latest decision construing the Pennsylvania statute dealt
with an action of malpractice, and held that the statute was tolled until the plain-
tiff knew or should have known of his injury. Whether the court means that
the statute is to be tolled in all personal injury actions until the plaintiff becomes
aware of his injury is not clear. Perhaps the decision should be interpreted as
applying to actions of malpractice only. For a clear answer, it will be necessary
to wait until a case involving something other than malpractice reaches the su-
preme court. It would seem, however, that the same reasons for holding that
the statute is tolled in an action for malpractice would also be applicable to other
actions for personal injury.
Although the supreme court in its latest decision on the question took the
more desirable position that the statute of limitations is tolled in an action for
malpractice until the plaintiff is, or should be, aware of his injury, there is still
doubt as to the law in Pennsylvania. The court did not overrule or even mention
its earlier decision which stated the law to be directly to the contrary. 7 There-
fore, that decision appears to be in force and might be relied upon for authority.
The court should have taken a more affirmative stand on the matter and over-
ruled the Bernath case; instead, it left the controversy unsettled.
The ultimate decision in Ayers v. Morgan is just, but there are certain
unfortunate aspects to the case. In addition to the fact that the court did not
overrule the Bernath case and forthrightly state when the statute of limitations
should start running, it reasoned its holding on other cases. For example, it
cites the cases of Foley v. Pittsburgh Des Moines Co. and DiGironimo v.
American Seed Co." in support of its position that the statute should not run
until the injured party learns of his injury. In neither of those cases, however,
was there a person who did not realize he had been injured. Instead, the de-
fendants contended that the statute ran from the time of the alleged negligence,
i.e., before any injury had occurred. The statute should never be interpreted to
sustain such a position. In fact, the court in the Foley case recognized Bernath v.
LeFever as the law in Pennsylvania."9
In at least one state, the problem of when the statute of limitations should
start to run has been settled by legislation, to wit:
2
6 See, e.g., OHIO GEN. CODE § 11225; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 50 (1947); CALIF. CODE CIv.
PRoc. §340 Subd. 3 (1949); MAss. GEN. LAW ch. 260 §4 (1943).
27 Bernath v. LeFever, supra note 14.
28 Supra note 8.
29 363 Pa. 1, 38, 68 A.2d 517, 535.
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Hereafter all actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error, . . mistake
or failure to treat or cure, against physicians, surgeons, . . . and sanataria shall
be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. The date
of the accrual of the cause of action shall be date of the wrongful act com-
plained of, and no other time.30 (Emphasis added).
This leaves no doubt as to when the statute starts running. The statute restates
the majority view, and although it is submitted that the opposite view is pref-
erable, this enactment at least settles the point. The results are predictable and
the statute eliminates confusion like that existing in Pennsylvania.
As previously noted, the Pennsylvania statute applies to all types of per-
sonal injuries. Since most litigation involving a plaintiff who does not realize
he is injured concerns malpractice, the Pennsylvania law makers could perform
a real service to the legal profession by enacting a statute applicable solely to
malpractice actions."' The act should provide that, in an action for malpractice,
the statute of limitations does not start to run until the injured party is, or
should be, aware of his injury." The enactment of such a statute would settle,
once and for all, the question of when the period of limitation should begin.
REESE A. DAVIS.
3 0 
ARK. STATS. (1947), § 37-205.
31 See, for example, the statutes cited in note 26 supra.
32 See, for example, a statute recommended for enactment in New York providing: "(a) a
one year limitation on malpractice, which however, (b) will not accrue until the malpractice is
discovered, but limited (c) to no more than six years." The recommended act has not been
adopted, however. See, Note 31 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 77, 80, (1946).
